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EXPERIENCE RATING AND UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION
EMERSON P. SCHMIDTt
EXPERIENCE rating has become an integral part of unemployment
insurance in the United States, although a few states have not adopted
it. Its proponents and opponents at times have exaggerated their own
claims in support of their respective views and have erected straw men
in order to discredit opposing views. Owing to the abnormal conditions
since the adoption of this principle, the test of experience remains in-
conclusive and is destined to continue so for some time to come, espe-
cially with respect to its effect on employment regularity.
OPPOSING ARGUMENTS
Experience rating has been criticized on a number of points. The
Social Security Board during the war frequently charged that this
feature of the state laws was responsible for the "loss" of over one
billion dollars to the funds, and that this might lead to the insolvency
of the funds during the postwar period. Again, it has been argued that
this principle has nothing to do with "social" insurance, and that it
gives employers an undue interest in benefit levels and eligibility re-
quirements. Critics frequently have argued that employers can do little
to reduce unemployment, although the recent demand for industry
guaranteed annual wages seems to negate this argument.
Experience rating is generally supported on three primary grounds:
(1) The risk of unemployment varies widely among different industrial
classifications and among employers within a specific classification;
therefore, in a free-consumer-choice society the cost and price structure
of each such classification and establishment (that is, commodity or
service) should be made to reflect this variation. (2) To some extent
the risk of unemployment is within the control of management; there-
fore, the tax or contribution rate levied upon each establishment should
bear some direct relation to the volume of unemployment accounted
for by it in order to give management a maximum incentive to mini-
mize layoffs. (3) With one group in society (employees) receiving all
the benefits, and another group (employers, in all but four states)
paying the tax contributions, experience rating is highly essential to
encourage a proper balance in establishing benefit levels and benefit
formulas, to stimulate an employer interest in the administration of the
program, and in general to act in a policing capacity to prevent the
program from degenerating into a relief program.
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SOLVENCY OF STATE RESERVES
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, a powerful drive was inaugurated to
secure a special federal appropriation of 300 million dollars to supple-
ment state programs during the conversion period. Dire consequences
were predicted if these extra funds were not made available. Congress
saw fit to ignore the appeal and, instead, encouraged prompt conversion
to war production so as to get on with the war and to minimize hard-
ship. The transition was safely made so that even Michigan, the state
hardest hit by the reduction in civilian production in 1942, paid out
only 72 cents in benefits for each dollar of unemployment compensa-
tion taxes collected in that year and thus actually added to its postvar
reserves.
Again, in 1944, as the European war appeared to be draiing to a
close, a drive was inaugurated (by the introduction of the Kilgore-
Murray bill) to provide federal money to supplement the funds avail-
able under the state systems. Dire predictions again were made that
some of the state funds would prove insolvent and many workers would
be deprived of benefits to which they were legally entitled. Under in-
vestigation, neither the Social Security Board nor other proponents of
the bill would name the vulnerable states, and it appeared to the
majority of Congressmen that the danger of postwar insolvency of
state funds was not a probability. Yet in order to guard against the
eventuality of insolvency, Congress provided for federal loans to the
states under certain conditions. By the beginning of 1945, with over
seven billion dollars in the reserve funds, there was general agreement
that if the government, labor and employers generally cooperate in
effectuating prompt reconversion to civilian production, there should
be little danger of insolvency, either in the transition or the early post-
war period, on the part of state funds. In the hearings in August and
September, 1945, on the proposals for federal supplementary benefits
the insolvency argument was not advanced.
By September, 1945, the state funds amounted to 7.3 billion dollars, a
sum in excess of 9 percent of the inflated payrolls (under $3,000) in peak
1944. In spite of the great increase in payrolls during the war, the
unemployment compensation reserves rose from 5.7 percent, at the
close of 1939, to over 9 percent by 1945. These reserves were sufficient
in 1944, the Social Security Board reported, to pay 66.5 percent of all
covered workers their maximum duration of benefits if that many
workers were to become unemployed in the transition period. In fact,
these reserves would have proved sufficient to pay benefits to 35.9
percent of all covered workers for a period of 26 weeks, at a weekly
benefit rate of 1/20th of high-quarter earnings, with a minimum of $5
for the lowest earning workers up to S25 per week for the better paid
workers. Yet it scarcely seems probable that anything like one-third
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of the covered workers will draw unemployment benefits which, in
amount, would equal their benefit rights for 26 weeks during the re-
conversion period, unless we do a very ineffective job of reconverting
to civilian production.'
These data, it needs to be emphasized, are "national" figures and
tell us nothing about the solvency of the funds of individual states.
Some state funds may be two to three times as solvent as some of the
others. Thus, Alaska, Kentucky, North Carolina and Oregon could
pay each and every covered worker (assuming 100 percent unemploy-
ment) his full benefits under the 1944 formulas of the respective state
laws and still have considerable funds left. Even the "least solvent"
states could pay maximum benefits to about 50 percent of the covered
workers. Thus, in spite of the reduction of funds due to experience
rating, there does not appear to be any great likelihood of any of the
funds becoming insolvent. This argument, therefore, is likely to ,be
little stressed in the near future.
EXPERIENCE RATING AND THE BENEFIT FORMULAS
During the hearings on the federal supplementation proposals
(H.R. 3736 and S.1274) immediately after V-J Day, the inadequacy of
the state coverage and benefit formulas was stressed. Much was made
of the employer interest in experience rating as a deterrent to adequate
protection. Yet, it was impossible to demonstrate that the states with-
out experience rating had been more liberal than those with this prin-
ciple in their laws.
When the "model bills" for unemployment compensation were
drafted a decade ago as a guide to the state legislatures, the friends of
these programs commonly proposed weekly benefits of 50 percent of
regular weekly earnings, with a top limit of about $15 per week and a
duration of thirteen or fifteen weeks. Originally most states adopted
this formula or one closely identical with it. Since then every state in
the union, except one, has made more liberal provisions. This one state
happens to be without experience ratihig.
Now the weekly benefit is derived in nearly all states by taking a
larger fraction than 1/26th (commonly used originally) of the highest
quarterly earnings (instead of average annual earnings) in the base
period. The original fraction (1/26th) would have provided a weekly
benefit of about 50 percent, but now the formula provides a weekly
benefit equal to about 60 percent or in some cases of about two-thirds
of the average wage in the high quarter. Nearly 85 percent of the states
have liberalized in this respect.
1. Since the data in the text were compiled, many states have liberalized their benefit
formulas; but this additional potential drajn on the reserves is offset, at least in part, by
the further growth of the state funds.
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The waiting period has been reduced, the maximum weekly benefit
amount has been pushed upward and the duration of benefit payments
has been greatly increased as Table I indicates.
TABLE I
LIBERALIZATION OF UNEMPLOYiENT BENEFIT FoImiuLAs: 1935-1945
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iNo legislative session in 1945.
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MLegislature has not yet acted
By August 1945, a maximum benefit of $20 or more was proided in
28 states which included 77.5 percent of all covered workers in the
country. A duration of twenty weeks or more was provided in 33 states,
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with 81 percent of all covered workers. A few states still lagged behind,
but this performance in the course of a single decade does not give any
substantial weight to the argument that experience rating has pre-
vented the liberalization of the benefit formulas.
While this liberalization has taken place, some tightening of eligi-
bility requirements and qualification features has occurred. There is
wide agreement that persons covered by these programs should be
substantially in the labor market, and that the millions of persons (for
example, department store help during the Christmas rush) who desire
work for only a few weeks in the year should not use unemployment
compensation for supplementing their wages. The question of dis-
qualifications, discussed elsewhere in this issue 2 raises many difficult
problems and serious differences of opinion as to proper standards,
The savings growing out of disqualifications generally have been very
small. The state legislatures strengthened the disqualification provi-
sions not in order to save the reserve funds but, rather, because nearly
everywhere it was a matter of common knowledge that a few workers
were taking advantage of the programs and collecting benefits to which
they were not entitled. Unquestionably, these disqualifications, at
times, led to some rather severe interpretations and perhaps even in-
equities. But any one familiar with this aspect of the program recog-
nizes that there are no easy solutions.
Thus, it does not appear that experience rating has impeded a gradual
improvement in coverage, in duration of payments and in the weeldy
benefit amount. Considering that these programs have been in exist-
ence for loss than a decade, we can safely assert that the state legisla-
tures on the whole have shown a commendable responsibility for their
obligations, although in practice there will always be differences of
opinion among students, as well as interested parties, as to the proper
formulation of these programs.
FINANCING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Except in four states, the entire cost of unemployment compensa-
tion is levied upon the employer and this method of financing was
justified largely in terms of experience rating. If the principle of ex-
perience rating is challenged, the challenge is usually accompanied by a
question as to the wisdom of levying the entire cost upon the employer.
A tax upon the employer measured by payrolls is one of the worst types
of taxes in terms of encouraging job expansion. The higher the wages,
the higher the tax; the greater the number of workers, the greater the
tax; every wage increase means a higher payroll tax; every worker
added to the payroll means an extra tax. It is under experience rating
coupled with effective employment stabilization that the employer's
2. See Eligibility and Disqualification, pages 117-204 supra.
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incentive to avoid the payroll tax is reduced, because the employer
may qualify for a reduced or zero rate. Raising wages or adding men
to the payroll is not penalized by the unemployment tax. With all the
concern over adequate postwar job opportunities, the state should not
levy a tax on employment unless there is some other overriding con-
sideration. Thus; if experience rating is to be questioned, we must also
raise the question of how best to finance the program.
From an economic point of view, experience rating has been criti-
cized because during high unemployment the employer's tax rate rises
and during prosperity, when the tax would least thw%-art enterprise
and employment, the rate declines. The policy, it is argued, should be
exactly reversed. 3 Since this criticism of experience rating has some
merit, its proponents would be well advised to discover techniques
which avoid tax increases during depressions. With the large state
reserves now in existence, it should be possible to develop formulas
which would postpone increases in rates during the early stages of and
at the bottom of depressions. Several states are making progress in
.this direction. Ten experience rating states during the recent war
boom adopted special war-risk rates so that they would not have to
impose unduly high rates during subsequent business recessions.
Given proper encouragement, we can depend on some further signifi-
cant developments in this direction.
EMPLOYMENT REGULARIZATION
Since experience rating is likely to stand or fall on its effect on
greater continuity of jobs, a brief analysis in these terms needs to be
made. No one believes that experience rating will stabilize the entire
economy. Its proponents commonly argue that to some extent unem-
ployment is within the control of management, and to that extent in-
centives can do something to minimize layoffs.
Because of the memories of the long depression unemployment in
the 1930's, we are inclined frequently to overlook the fact that there
are many other types or causes of unemployment: seasonal demand,
seasonal supply, technological, frictional and structural, as well as
casual. Before the 1930's, it was generally assumed that causes other
3. Employment Policy, representing the policy of the Churchill British Government,
adopted flexible contribution rates (not connected with experience rating) under which the
joint rates on employers and workers would fluctuate in a contra cyclical fashion from 5 to
10 shillings per week, the highest rate applying when unemployment is under 5 percent and
the lowest rate applying when unemployment stands at over 11 percent. But Sir William
Beveridge questions the flexing of rates in this way on practical and psychological grounds.
He doubts the value of such shifts and states that it would be difficult to get the taxpayers
to see why, when there is less unemployment, they should be asked to pay more on behalf
of some future unemployment. See EuPLO1WEN-r PoLicY (British Ministry of Reconstruc-
tion, Cmd. 6527, May 1944);'BEVERIDGE, FULL E~ssLo' jN"T IN A FnrE Socmm' (1944)
263.
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than depressions accounted for the bulk of unemployment. What the
situation will be in the future is indeterminate. All would agree, how-
ever, that conscious efforts by management can minimize, and in some
cases even eliminate, these causes of unemployment. The more short-
run, or controllable, unemployment is reduced, the :More practical it
becomes to extend the duration of unemployment compensation pay-
ments in those cases where unemployment is not eradicable.
Frequently it is asserted that certain industries-insurance, finance,
public utilities and service trades as well as some non-durable con-
sumer goods manufacturing industries-are naturally stable, and that
these automatically get the benefit of experience rating without any
effort toward stabilization. If one thinks of unemployment as asso-
ciated only with depressions, there is of course something to this argu-
ment. But when one looks at the facts of unemployment in their com-
prehensive nature, this argument loses some of its validity. Thus, to
take just one example, Wisconsin experience shows that 27 cents had
been paid out in unemployment benefits for each dollar of contribu-
tions collected through December 31, 1940, for those employers who,
as of that date, had been paying contributions for six and one-half years
and whose accounts had been liable for benefit payments for four and
one-half years. For the same period, the utility industry as a whole
did much better than this, as shown in Table II. But the significant
phenomenon to be noted is that among the utilities both as to the
classifications and among the individual companies within each class,
the performance was highly divergent. Thus while the electric light
TABLE II
EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN WISCONSIN THROUGH
DECEMBER 31, 1940*
Percentage of Premium Contributions
Charged as Unemployment BenefitsType of Industry Idstya
Industry as
a Whole Best Company Worst Company
Taxicabs 4.7% 0.0% 32.3%
Telephone Communication 4.7 0.0 41.2
Telegraph Communication 10.8 10.4 12.2
Electric Light and Power 21.8 0.0 51,9
Gas, Heating and Illuminat-
ing 11.2 10.5 19.4
Electric Light and Power
and Gas Combined 8.8 5.3 23.2
Water Supply Systems 3.8 0.0 8.5
*All of the employers in this table had 6.5 years of contribution ex-
perience and 4.5 years of benefit paying experience at the close of 1940.
All data from the Wisconsin Industrial Commission.
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and power companies had on the average been charged with 21.8 per-
cent of their cumulative contributions for unemployment benefits by
December 31, 1940, the best company had paid no benefits and the
most unstable company had paid out more than half of its cumulative
contributions. Certainly this table, which could be duplicated from
most, if not all, other classifications, demonstrates that unemployment
is to some extent controllable.
The payroll tax savings derived through regularized employment
may be substantial, especially in those cases where wage costs are a
sizable portion of total costs; for example, in the laundry and cleaning
business, wage and salary costs may amount to 60 percent of all costs.
The savings for the 44 states which have experience ratings are indi-
cated in Table III. These run from a minimum of $10 to a maximum
of $40 per $1,000 of covered payroll. These are concrete, recurring
savings which are subject to accounting measurements, whereas other





Savings per $,ooo Aumber of
Payroll* States
$10 to $12 5
13to 20 11
21 to 27 21
271 to 40 7
"Tax based on first $3,000 of
payroll.
Cost of Stabilization.
Employment regularization in many instances costs money and the
savings under experience rating may in some cases help offset these
costs. For example, if a ski manufacturer decides that he will produce
skis on a year-round basis, as several have done, he is faced with the
necessity of building a warehouse, extra handling and insurance costs,
higher taxes on finished inventory, and the temporary freezing of the
money tied up in the finished product. In deciding whether or not to
operate on a year-round basis, the employer will balance the sauings
against the costs of continuous operation. It is the theory of the state
legislatures that in thousands of cases the potential payroll tax savings
which accrue from continuous operation would tip the balance in favor
of operating a plant the year around or at least more regularly.
Similarly, if a lawn mower manufacturer decides to develop a new
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slack-period product, many financial outlays are necessary. Anyone
familiar with the problem of developing and establishing new products,
even by well-established companies, knows that a long process of
technical and market research, much trial and error, are necessary
before new products can be put on a self-supporting basis.
In many instances, consumer buying habits can be changed by
offering slack-period consumer discounts. Frequently, it is necessary
to offer these discounts not only to consumers but also to wholesalers
and retailers. All this may mean at least temporary impairment of
profits and probably the incurrence of losses.
Those who have studied the operation of the experience rating in
Wisconsin, where it has been in effect the longest, state that thousands
of employees who formerly had highly intermittent and unsteady work
now have more continuous incomes. At least a dozen Wisconsin com-
panies, which formerly experienced an annual shut-down, operated on
a year-round basis just before the var. A hardwood floor manufacturer
who provided year-round employment for no one in the plant before
1934 provided continuous employment for 96 percent of the peak
number of employees in 1940. A meat-packing plant which had aver-
age annual layoffs of 64 percent from 1926 to 1935 has reduced this
figure to less than 10 percent in each of the years 1936 to 1945.
4
Cyclical Unemployment.
To some extent, the same frame of mind and the same techniques
which are eliminating short-run unemployment will mitigate cyclical
or depressional unemployment. Economists have consistently depre-
cated overexpansion on the ground that excessive booms are likely to
be followed by slumps. Under experience rating, employers expand
with more caution and with better reason. This should reduce the
severity of business fluctuations.
A building supply manufacturer has diversified his line to the point
where now 40 percent of his raw material is fabricated into non-
durable consumer goods, the demand for which remains remarkably
stable regardless of general business conditions. When the next de-
pression comes this policy of diversification will provide a cushion of
employment for his people.
Several employers state that in planning research and new products
they make a conscious effort to time the promotion of such new prod-
ucts in terms of the business cycle. Every student of business cycles
knows that major depressions are attributable to many factors, and
4. The problems encountered and the regulation procedures adopted in these cases
and many others are reported in To MAKE JOBS MORE STEADY AND To MAIFz MORE
STEADY JOBS (Webb Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1942).
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no one would argue that experience rating will eliminate depressions.3
However, it must be recognized that both business booms and slumps'
are caused by human decisions. The factors controlling these deci-
sions will be modified to some extent now. Preliminary evidence
suggests that experience rating is a new factor tending to mitigate
business fluctuations. Formerly, labor costs were viewed as prime
costs which tended to vary quite directly with output. Under unem-
ployment compensation, labor costs are to some extent converted from
prime or variable costs to overhead costs. That is, labor costs are no
longer completely avoidable by merely laying off the worker. For this
reason employers under experience rating will have a new incentive to
operate continuously since, within limits, they have to pay for labor
whether they use it or not.
Another factor pointing in this same direction involves a possible
reallocation of resources. It is more difficult to regularize employment
in the durable goods industries (housing, motor cars, machinery, etc.)
than in the non-durable consumer goods industries. Therefore, the
former will pay the higher unemployment compensation tax rates to
the extent to which unemployment cannot be avoided; the products of
these industries will tend to rise in price. Consequently, less labor and
capital resources will be devoted to producing these products, assuming
some elasticity of demand, the consumption at these higher prices
having decreased. This should encourage the absorption of relatively
more labor in the non-durable goods industries where prices can be
relatively lower and thereby encourage greater stability in the economy
as a whole. How important this factor will be, in making for greater
stability, is not known at this time.
Finally, in terms of the so-called acceleration principle, any addi-
tional stability attained in the consumer goods industries should be
transferred in somewhat more than direct proportion to the durable




The period during which experience rating has been tried has been
brief, as well as one characterized by great world disturbances. For
these reasons, conclusive evidence on the possibilities of experience
rating working in the direction intended and outlined herein is not
available, but this experiment in social legislation deserves thorough-
going cooperation on the part of all groups in society. Employers have
5. See Jasms ARTHUR ESTEY, BusinEss CYcLES (1941).
6. See id. at 169-78.
7. For a more complete discussion of this and the preccding point Ece E. C. Lindblom,
Long-Run Considerations in Employment Stabilization and UMicnp!oymet Corpensation
(1941) 56 Q. J. EcoN. 145.
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been furnished this potential tax saving as an incentive for regularizing
their operations, and whether the savings feature of the laws will be
retained may depend on the degree to which employers will respond by
making every effort to regularize employment.
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the two other argu-
ments for the principle have independent merit: first, to allocate the
necessary tax collections throughout the economy roughly in accord
with the volume of unemployment attributable to each plant and in-
dustry so that the cost and price structure of each commodity will
more nearly reflect the true cost without leaning on other parts of the
economy; and second, to help establish some degree of equilibrium
between revenue intake and benefit outgo under the rather anomalous
situation wherein a small number of employers do the paying and a
large number of workers get all the benefits. Because of this latter
danger to the soundness of social insurance, Sir William Beveridge has
been insistent upon employee contributions to the funds.
With the distribution of voting strength which prevails in a democ-
racy, it is easy to see why the employer interest generated by experi-
ence rating in benefit levels and in benefit formulas generally, has not
prevented liberalization. In fact, very considerable liberalization has
already taken place, considering the youthfulness of the program, just
as has been the case in workmen's compensation. On the other hand,
the interest of employers, as a result of experience rating, may serve
to protect the funds against unwise dissipation.
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